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Abstract
Routine operational use of sensitive data is commonly
governed by laws and regulations. For instance, in
the medical domain, there are various laws at the state
and federal level that dictate who is permitted to work
with patients’ records and under what conditions. To
screen for potential privacy breaches, logging systems
typically trigger alerts whenever a suspicious access
is detected. However, the efficiency of such mecha-
nism is low because 1) the vast majority of alerts are
false positive and 2) limited budget leads to a small
chance of detecting the true attack. To improve effi-
ciency, information systems may invoke signaling so
that whenever a suspicious access request occurs, the
system can, in real time, warn the user that the access
may be audited. At the end of some period, a selected
subset of suspicious accesses are then audited. This
gives rise to an online problem in which one needs to
determine 1) whether a warning should be triggered
and 2) the likelihood that the event of data request will
be audited. In this work, we formulate this problem as
a Signaling Audit Game (SAG), study the properties
of its Stackelberg equilibria, and develop a scalable
approach to compute its solution. We show that an
intelligent presentation of warnings adds value in that
SAGs can realize significantly higher utility for the
auditor than systems without signaling. We perform
an analysis over 10 million real access events in a
large academic medical center to illustrate the value
of our approach.
1 Introduction
Information systems are often armed with an alerting ca-
pability to detect and notify about potential risks incurred
during daily use. This entails the logging of access events,
which can be compared to various rules, each of which
defines a semantic type of potentially malicious situation.
In mission critical systems, the access requests of authen-
ticated users are often granted, so that notification about
potential misuse is provided to administrators who per-
form retrospective audit investigations [Kuna et al., 2014;
Blocki et al., 2012]. For instance, many healthcare organiza-
tions (HCOs) rely on both alert mechanisms and auditing for
monitoring anomalous accesses to electronic medical records
(EMRs) by their employees who may breach the privacy of
patients [Hedda et al., 2017]. Similarly, the providers of online
services, such as banks and social media applications, often
use alerts and audits to defend against attacks, such as financial
fraud and compromises to computational resources. Though
audits do not directly prevent attacks in their own right, they
allow for the discovery of breaches that can be followed up on
before they escalate to full blown exploits by attackers.
However, there are various challenges to instituting robust
auditing schemes in practice. First, the volume of triggered
alerts is typically far greater than the auditing capacity of an
organization [Laszka et al., 2017]. Second, in practice, the ma-
jority of triggered alerts correspond to false positives, which
stem from an organization’s inability to define and recognize
complex dynamic workflows. Third, attackers can act strategi-
cally, such that they can carefully choose the way (or target)
to attack. And last, but not least, in the retrospective audit
setting, attacks are not discovered until they are investigated.
The Stackelberg security game (SSG) is a natural choice
for modeling such resource allocation problems in adversarial
environments [Tambe, 2011; Fang et al., 2016; Do et al., 2017;
Sinha et al., 2018]. Here, the defender first commits to a bud-
get allocation policy and, subsequently, the attacker responds
with the optimal attack based on the defender’s strategy. The
audit game is a variation of the SSG aiming to generate an
efficient audit strategy [Blocki et al., 2013; Blocki et al., 2015;
Yan et al., 2018]. For strategic auditing, most research has
focused on solving or approximating the Strong Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SSE) to obtain the defense strategy.
Unfortunately, it was recently shown that merely applying
the SSE strategy may have limited efficacy in some security
settings [Xu et al., 2015]. This situation may be remedied
through strategic information revelation to the attacker [Xu et
al., 2015; Rabinovich et al., 2015], a mechanism referred to as
signaling (a.k.a., persuasion [Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011;
Dughmi and Xu, 2016]). The idea is to set up a signaling
scheme to reveal noisy information to the attacker and thus
influence the attacker’s decision towards outcomes that favor
the defender. However, all previous approaches rely on the
game procedure that resources are allocated before signaling
and thus can serve as a source of informational advantages
for signaling. Yet, in our audit setting, the decision sequence
is reversed: the signal is revealed (e.g., via a warning screen)
at the time of access, whereas the audit occurs after a certain
period. This poses new challenges for the design of signaling.
It should be emphasized that some organizations have rec-
ognized the potential efficacy of signaling mechanisms for
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protecting sensitive data. For example, [Blinded-for-Review-
Purpose], a large academic medical center, announced in 2018
a new policy to protect the privacy of patients with a “Person
of Interest” designation, such as celebrities and public figures.
In this policy, access to the EMRs of these individuals trig-
gers a pop-up warning requesting a justification for the access.
Upon seeing the warning, one can decide whether to proceed
to the access or not, and each access is logged for potential
auditing. However, this policy is currently implemented in a
post hoc manner, without carefully optimizing the signaling
and auditing.
In this paper, we propose the Signaling Audit Game (SAG),
which applies signaling to alert auditing. We leverage the time
gap between the access request by the attacker and the ac-
tual execution of the attack to insert the signaling mechanism.
When an alert is triggered by a suspicious access request, the
system can send in real time a warning to the requestor. At this
point, the attacker has an opportunity to re-evaluate his utility
given the warning, and decides whether or not to continue
his attack. Different from previous relevant models which are
all offline, the SAG optimizes both the warning strategy and
the audit decision in real time for each incoming alert. To
assess the performance of the SAG, we evaluate the expected
utility of the auditor on a real dataset of over 10 million EMR
accesses and predefined alert types from a major academic
medical center. The results demonstrate that the SAG out-
performs state-of-the-art game theoretic alternatives that lack
signaling while inducing nominal increases in computational
burden.
2 Online Signaling in Audit Games
In this section, we describe our model of SAG in the general
context of information services. For illustration purpose, we
use healthcare auditing as a running example setting.
2.1 Motivating Domain
To provide efficient healthcare service, healthcare organiza-
tions (HCOs) typically store and process each patient’s clinical,
demographic, and financial information in an electronic med-
ical record (EMR) system. EMR users, such as physicians
and management staff, need to access patients’ EMRs when
providing healthcare services. The routine workflow can be ab-
stracted into two steps: 1) a user requests to access a patient’s
record and 2) the system returns this record. Due to the com-
plex, dynamic and time-sensitive nature of healthcare, HCOs
typically grant employees broad access privileges, which un-
fortunately creates an opportunity for malicious insiders to
exploit patients’ records [Gunter et al., 2011].
To deter malicious access, breach detection tools are com-
monly deployed to trigger alerts in real time for the admin-
istrator whenever suspicious events occur. Alerts are often
marked with predefined types of potential violations which
help streamline inspection.1 Subsequently, a subset of alerts
are retrospectively audited at the end of each audit cycle, and
the auditor determines which constitute actual policy violation.
1Notable alert types include accessing the EMR of co-workers,
neighbors, family members, and VIPs [Hedda et al., 2017].
2.2 Signaling Audit Games
Here, we formalize the Signaling Auditing Game (SAG)
model. An SAG is played between an auditor (she) and an
attacker (he) within a pre-defined audit cycle (e.g., one day).
This game is sequential, with alerts arriving one at a time. For
each alert, the auditor needs to make two decisions in real
time: first, which signal to send (e.g., to warn the user/attacker,
or not), and second, whether to audit the alert. Formally, let
Xτc denote the event that alert τ will be audited, and X
τ
u de-
note that it is not audited. Further, ξτ1 denotes the event that a
warning signal is sent for alert τ , while ξτ0 denotes the event
that no warning is sent (this can be thought of as a “silent sig-
nal”). The warning ξτ1 is delivered privately through a dialog
box on the requestor’s screen, saying “Your access may be
investigated. Would you like to proceed?”. Xτc , X
τ
u , ξ
τ
1 , ξ
τ
1 are
random variables whose probabilities are to be designed.
We assume that there is a finite set of alert types T and, for
each t ∈ T , all alerts of type t are equivalent for our purposes
(i.e., attacks triggering alerts of type t all result in similar
damages). The auditor has an auditing budget B that limits
the number of alerts that can be audited at the end of the cycle.
For each alert type t, let V t denote the cost (or time needed)
to audit an alert of type t. Thus, if θt is the probability of
auditing alerts of type t and dt is the number of such alerts,
the budget constraint implies that
∑
t θ
t · V tdt ≤ B.
Since the setting is online, an optimal policy for the auditor
must consider all possible histories of alerts. Given that this
is impractical, we consider a simpler scheme in which each
alert is viewed independently of alerts that precede it, and
which considers future alerts in terms of their average relative
frequency. As a side effect, this considerably simplifies the
model of attacks we need to consider. Specifically, we assume
that each attack effectively selects an alert type t, but do not
need to consider the timing of attacks (we simply treat each
alert as potentially adversarial). This implicitly assumes that
an attack (e.g., stealing an EMR) triggers a single alert. How-
ever, this is without loss of generality, since we can define
alert types which capture all realistic multi-alert combinations.
Now, we define the payoffs to the auditor and attacker. For
convenience, we refer to the alert corresponding to an attack
as the victim alert. If the auditor fails to audit a victim alert of
type t, the auditor and the attacker will receive utility U td,u and
U ta,u, respectively. On the other hand, if the auditor audits a
victim alert of type t, the auditor and the attacker will receive
utility U td,c and U
t
a,c, respectively. Here, the subscripts c and
u stand for covered and uncovered, respectively. Naturally, we
assume U ta,c < 0 < U
t
a,u and U
t
d,c ≥ 0 > U td,u.
A warning signaling scheme, captured by the joint probabil-
ity distribution of signaling and auditing, can be fully specified
by the following four variables for each τ :
P(ξτ1 , X
τ
c ) = p
τ
1 , P(ξ
τ
1 , X
τ
u) = q
τ
1 ,
P(ξτ0 , X
τ
c ) = p
τ
0 , P(ξ
τ
0 , X
τ
u) = q
τ
0 .
(1)
Upon receiving the signal, the attacker reacts as follows:
• After ξτ1 : the system presents two choices to the attacker:
“Proceed” to access the requested record or “Quit”.
• After ξτ0 : the attacker automatically proceeds to access
the requested record (since he receives no warning).
We assume that our signaling scheme has no effect on normal
behavior, so normal users always proceed. We acknowledge
that this may happen, but this particular issue of usability is
beyond the scope of our investigation. For convenience, when
possible we omit the superscript τ when τ , i.e., the alert we
are dealing with, is readily apparent from the context.
Figure 1 illustrates the temporal sequence of decisions in
the SAG. Each edge in the figure is marked with the associated
joint probability of a sequence of decisions up to and including
that edge. Note that the two gray nodes are not extended
because they do not lead to any subsequent event.2 Further,
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Figure 1: The decision tree of the auditor and any user, whose actions
are shown in green and red, respectively.
observe that, p1+q1+p0+q0 = 1, and the overall probability
of auditing this alert is P(Xc) = P(Xc, ξ1) + P(Xc, ξ0) =
p1 + p0. Conditional on the warning signal ξ1, the probability
of auditing this alert is thus P(Xc|ξ1) = p1/(p1 + q1).
Since the auditor has a fixed auditing budget, she will need
to update the remaining budget after determining the signal-
conditional audit probability for the current alert. We use Bτ
to denote the remaining budget before receiving alert τ . Let
t denote the type of alert τ and τ + 1 denote the next alert.
After the signaling scheme for τ is executed, the auditor then
updates Bτ for the use of the next alert τ + 1 as follows:
• If ξτ1 is sampled: Bτ+1 = Bτ − pτ1/(pτ1 + qτ1 ) · V t.
• If ξτ0 is sampled: Bτ+1 = Bτ − pτ0/(pτ0 + qτ0 ) · V t.
Additionally, we always ensure that Bτ ≥ 0. The key chal-
lenge in our model is to compute the optimal pτ1 , q
τ
1 , p
τ
0 , q
τ
0
for each alert τ online by accounting for remaining budget
and our estimation of future alerts. This needs to be done to
ensure that the auditor does not spend the budget at a rate that
is excessively fast or slow.
Without signaling, our audit game can be solved offline,
at the end of the audit cycle. This situation can be captured
by a Stackelberg security game by viewing alerts as targets
[Tambe, 2011]. The optimal auditing probabilities can then
be determined offline by computing the SSE of this game.
However, as our experiments show, this “simpler” strategy
(which we refer to as offline SSE) performs substantially worse
than our approach.
The SAG can be viewed as a variation on the Stackelberg
game, except that it includes signaling and makes decisions
about auditing online upon the arrival of each alert. Our so-
lution concept is therefore a Strong Stackelberg equilibrium
of the SAG, in which the auditor commits to a randomized
2The upper gray node corresponds to the case when an access
request is abandoned. The lower one represents an impossible case
because the user automatically gets the requested record.
joint signaling and auditing decision, the associated probabil-
ity distribution is observed by the attcker, who then decides
first upon the alert type to use, and subsequently whether to
proceed after a warning. We will seek the optimal randomized
commitment strategy for the auditor in this game.
Our SAG model exhibits two crucial differences from prior
studies of signaling in security games. The first is that the
signaling scheme for each alert in a SAG must be optimized
one after another in real time. By contrast, previous models,
such as [Xu et al., 2015], decide the signaling schemes for all
targets simultaneously in an offline fashion. The second is in
how private information is leveraged. In previous models, the
defender utilizes the informational advantage she currently
has (e.g., knowledge about the realized protection status of
the target) to deceive the attacker. However, in our scenario,
the auditor first decides the signaling scheme, by when she
has an equal amount of information as the attacker, and then
implements her informational advantage after the audit cycle
ends (by deciding which to audit).
3 Optimizing SAGs
In this section, we design an algorithm for solving SAGs. We
will fix the alert τ of type t; thus the superscript τ will at times
be omitted for notational convenience. We begin by consider-
ing the problem of computing the real time SSE of the game
without signaling that transpires for a given observed alert τ .
The solution of this game provides a crucial ingredient in com-
puting the optimal signaling scheme, which we subsequently
discuss.
3.1 Computing Marginal Auditing Probabilities
First, we need to compute the SSE of the game without signal-
ing in which we determine the probabilities with which each
alert type is to be audited, given the remaining budget.
Consider the arrival of an alert τ and suppose that Bτ is the
remaining budget for inspecting alerts. Let dtτ be the number
of future alerts of each type t ∈ T after alert τ is triggered.3
We assume that dtτ follows a Poisson distributionD
t
τ .
We can compute the SSE strategy using a multiple linear
programming (LP) approach, for each possible budget Bτ . In
this approach, for each alert type t, we assume that t is the at-
tacker’s best response, and then compute the optimal auditing
strategy as if t were the best response. Finally, we choose the
best solution (in terms of the auditor’s utility) among all of the
LPs as the SSE strategy.
Now, let θt
′
(t) be the probability of auditing an alert of
type t′ when the attacker’s best response is t. In addition to
this optimal auditing policy, we will design how we plan to
split the remaining budget among all alert types. This is an
approximation that allows us to consider the long-term impact
of our decision about auditing by assuming that the same
auditing distribution will remain active for future alerts. Let
the individual budgets we allocate for inspecting alerts of each
type t be denoted by a vectorBτ = {B1τ , B2τ , ..., B|T |τ }. Note
that the long-term budget allocation decision is constrained
3The vast majority of alerts are false positives. Consequently, we
can estimate dtτ from alert log data.
by the remaining auditing budget:
∑|T |
t=1B
t
τ ≤ Bτ . The
following LP then computes the optimal auditing strategy
assuming t is the best response:
maxBτ θ
t(t) · U td,c + (1− θt(t)) · U td,u
s.t.
∀t′, θt(t) · U ta,c + (1− θt(t)) · U ta,u
≥ θt′(t) · U t′a,c + (1− θt
′
(t)) · U t′a,u,
∀t′, θt′(t) = Edt′τ ∼Dt′τ
(
Bt
′
τ
V t′dt′τ
)
,∑|T |
t′=1B
t′
τ ≤ Bτ , ∀t′, Bt
′
τ ∈ [0, Bτ ],
(2)
The first constraint ensures that t is indeed the attacker’s
best response. After solving |T | instances of LP (2), the best
solution for the auditor will henceforth be referred to as the
online SSE strategy (or simply, the SSE), θSSE .
3.2 Optimal Signaling
Armed with an approach for computing the online SSE, we
now describe how to compute the optimal signaling scheme.
From the perspective of the attacker, whether to proceed
or quit after a warning depends on his conditional expected
utility:
Eta(util|ξ1) =
p1
p1 + q1
· U ta,c +
q1
p1 + q1
· U ta,u.
We impose the constraint Eta(util|ξ1) ≤ 0 such that the at-
tacker’s best response to ξ1 is to quit, in which case both
players will receive 0 utility. We do not enforce constraints
for ξ0 because the potential attacker does not have any option
but to proceed. In this case, the expected auditor utility is
Etd(util|ξ0) =
p0
p0 + q0
· U td,c +
q0
p0 + q0
· U td,u.
Overall, the auditor’s expected utility for the auditor is
Etd(util) = (p0 + q0) · Etd(util|ξ0) = p0 · U td,c + q0 · U td,u.
The optimal signaling scheme (or, more concretely, joint
signaling and audit probabilities) can thus be computed via an
LP:
max
p0,p1,q0,q1
p0 · U td,c + q0 · U td,u
s.t. p1 · U ta,c + q1 · U ta,u ≤ 0,
p1 + p0 = θ
t
SAG,
q1 + q0 = 1− θtSAG,
p1, p0, q1, q0 ∈ [0, 1],
(3)
where θtSAG is the fixed marginal auditing probability
which we assume is given. The first constraint represents
Eta(util|ξ1) ≤ 0. We refer to the optimal solution of LP (3) as
the Online Stackelberg Signaling Policy (OSSP).
LP (3) assumes that θtSAG are known; however, these are
endogenous to the auditor’s policy and should be designed
together with the signaling scheme. Unfortunately, simultane-
ously designing the entire signaling scheme is challenging due
to uncertainties in both signal sampling and future alerts. The
following theorem shows that under mild assumptions (which
are typically satisfied in our domain of interest), the marginal
auditing probabilities can be computed independently. These
will, in fact, be the online SSE of the SAG sans signaling.
Theorem 1. Let θtSAG be the marginal coverage probability in
OSSP at any given game status and θtSSE be the corresponding
marginal coverage probability in the online SSE. Then, in a
SAG, for each type t ∈ T , θtSAG = θtSSE .
Proof. Given any game state, the auditor has an estimate about
the sets of future alerts. We prove that for any fixed set of
alerts, θtSAG = θ
t
SSE holds for each type t ∈ T . As a result,
in expectation over the probabilistic estimate, this still holds.
Fixing a set of alerts, the auditor’s decision is a stan-
dard Stackelberg game. We start by introducing notation
for formalization. Let Ea(θtSSE) [Ea(θtSAG)] denote the at-
tacker’s expected utility for the triggered alert of type t when
it is protected with probability θtSSE [θ
t
SAG]. Notice that
Ea(θtSSE) [Ea(θtSAG)] is a strictly decreasing function of
θtSSE [θ
t
SAG]. Let Essea denote the attacker’s utility at the
SSE and Eosspa be the attacker’s utility at the OSSP. We claim
that Eosspa = Ea(θtSAG) if θtSAG > 0 for all τ , thus t. Assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that an alert τ ′ of type t′ with
positive coverage probability is not the best response of the
attacker in the SAG. Then, we can redistribute the protection
resources from τ ′ to the alerts of the attacker’s best-response
type. This increases the coverage probability of these alerts
and, thus, increases the auditor’s utility, which contradicts the
optimality of OSSP.
Next, we prove that Essea = Eosspa implies θtSAG = θtSSE
for all τ , thus t, as desired. This is because θtSAG > θ
t
SSE(≥
0) implies Eosspa = Ea(θtSAG) < Ea(θtSSE) = Essea (a con-
tradiction) and θtSAG < θ
t
SSE implies Eosspa ≥ Ea(θtSAG) >
Ea(θtSSE) = Essea (again, a contradiction). As a result, it must
be the case that θtSSE = θ
t
SAG for all τ , and thus t, as desired.
We now show that Essea = Eosspa must hold true. Assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that Essea > Eosspa . Then for
any θtSSE > 0, we must have θ
t
SAG > θ
t
SSE . This is be-
cause θtSAG ≤ θtSSE implies that Eosspa ≥ Ea(θtSAG) ≥
Ea(θtSSE) = Essea , which is a contradiction. On the other
hand, for any θtSAG > 0, θ
t
SAG > θ
t
SSE must be true, be-
cause 0 < θtSAG ≤ θtSSE implies that Essea = Ea(θtSSE) ≤
Ea(θtSAG) = Eosspa , which is a contradiction. As a re-
sult, it must be the case that either θtSSE = θ
t
SAG = 0 or
θtSAG > θ
t
SSE for any τ , thus t. Yet this contradicts the fact
that
∑
τ θ
t
SSE =
∑
τ θ
t
SAG = B. Similarly, Essea < Eosspa
can not hold true. As a result, Essea = Eosspa is true.
Therefore, the optimal signaling scheme can be obtained by
solving the online SSE (LP (2)) and then inserting it to LP (3).
4 Theoretical Properties of SAGS
In this section, we theoretically analyze the properties of the
OSSP solution (equivalently, of the SAG equilibrium). We
first prove that the signaling procedure never hurts.
Theorem 2. The expected utility of the auditor by applying
the OSSP is never worse than when the online SSE is applied.
Proof. If the attacker will complete the attack, his expected
utility is Eta(util) = (p1 + p0) · U ta,c + (q1 + q0) · U ta,u.
• If Eta(util) < 0, then the attacker will choose to not
approach any target at the beginning, regardless of if there
exists a signaling mechanism. Thus, the auditor in both
cases will achieve the same expected utility, which is 0.
• If Eta(util) ≥ 0, then let p1 = 0 and q1 = 0. Then, it
follows that p0 = θtSSE and q0 = 1−θtSSE . This solution
satisfies all of the constraints in LP (3). Thus, the expected
utilities of the auditor, by applying OSSP and SSE, are
the same: Etd(util) = p0 · U td,c + q0 · U td,u.
This begs the following question: can applying the OSSP
bring strictly more benefit to the expected utility of the auditor?
Our experiments lend support to an answer of YES.
Our next result shows an interesting property about the
optimal signaling scheme. Interestingly, it turns out that if
there is no warning sent, then the auditor will not audit the
triggered alerts in their optimal strategy (i.e., p0 = 0) .
Theorem 3. In any SAG whose payoff structure satisfies U ta,c ·
U td,u − U td,c · U ta,u > 0 for all t, p0 = 0 in its OSSP.
Proof. First, we substitute p1 and q1 with θtSSE − p0 and
1 − θtSSE − q0, respectively. The first constraint becomes
p0 · U ta,c + q0 · U ta,u ≥ θtSSE · U ta,c + (1 − θtSSE) · U ta,u.
We set up a Cartesian coordinate system and let q0 be the
vertical axis and p0 the horizontal one. Geometrically, the
slopes of the objective function−U td,c/U td,u and the constraint
−U ta,c/U ta,u are both positive. Note that, though we do not
constrain Eta(util|ξu) = p0 · U ta,c + q0 · U ta,u > 0 (its slope
is the same as the first constraint in LP (3)), this inequality is
always true. If not the case, the attacker will not attack initially.
We discuss the righthand side β = θtSSE ·U ta,c+(1− θtSSE) ·
U ta,u as follows.
• β ≤ 0. In this setting, the first constraint in LP (3) is dom-
inated. The boundary of the dominant constraint passes
the origin. The feasible region is either a right triangle
or a right trapezoid with their base on the vertical axis.
Thus, in both cases, if U ta,c ·U td,u −U td,c ·U ta,u > 0 holds
true (which means the slope of the objective function is
greater than the boundary’s slope of the dominant con-
straint), then p0 = q0 = 0 leads to the maximum of
the objective function, which is 0. The OSSP, thus is
p1 = θ
t
SSE , q1 = 1− θtSSE , p0 = q0 = 0.
• β > 0. Thus, the first constraint in LP (3) dominates
p0 · U ta,c + q0 · U ta,u > 0. The boundary’s intercept
of the dominant constraint is δ = (θtSSE · U ta,c + (1 −
θtSSE) · U ta,u)/U ta,u ∈ (0, 1]. Using an analysis similar
to the previous case of β, only when p0 = 0, q0 = δ
leads to the maximum of the objective function, which is
Utd,u
Uta,u
· (θtSSE · U ta,c + (1 − θtSSE) · U ta,u). The OSSP is
p1 = θ
t
SSE , p0 = 0, q1 = 1−θtSSE−(θtSSE ·U ta,c+(1−
θtSSE) · U ta,u)/U ta,u, q0 = (θtSSE · U ta,c + (1 − θtSSE) ·
U ta,u)/U
t
a,u.
Remark. In application domains, −U ta,c/U ta,u >
−U td,c/U td,u is often naturally satisfied. For the attacker, the
absolute value of the penalty is often greater than the benefit
from committing attacks. As for the auditor, her benefit from
Table 1: A summary of the daily statistics per alert types.
ID Alert Type Description Mean Std
1 Same Last Name 196.57 17.30
2 Department Co-worker 29.02 5.56
3 Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 140.46 23.23
4 Same Address 10.84 3.73
5 Last Name; Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 25.43 4.51
6 Last Name; Same Address 15.14 4.10
7 Last Name; Same Address; Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 43.27 6.45
catching an attack is often less than the absolute value of the
loss due to miss an attack.
Theorem 3 raises another question: can the attacker keep at-
tacking until receiving no warning, in which case he can attack
safely under OSSP? This approach cannot succeed because
once the attacker chooses to quit, his identity is essentially
revealed.4 Therefore, his “successful” attack later will only
hurt him because it helps the auditor to find forensic evidence
of his attack (this may require additional auditing but it is a
common practice in this domain and is cost-effective since
such “Quit” behaviors are rare). As a result, once an attacker
chooses to quit, his best response should be to not attack.
Our final theory concerns the attacker’s utility in OSSP.
Theorem 4. The expected utility of the attacker when applying
the OSSP is the same as that achieved when applying the
online SSE strategy.
Proof. In the OSSP, the expected utility for the attacker is
K = p0 · U ta,c + q0 · U ta,u. In the corresponding SSE strategy,
his expected utility is J = (p1+p0)·U ta,c+(q1+q0)·U ta,u. We
divide the proof into the same two cases as shown in Theorem
3. In the first case, where β ≤ 0, after plugging in the OSSP,
we find K = 0 and J = p1 · U ta,c + q1 · U ta,u ≤ 0. Thus, the
attacker will never attack. In the second case, where β > 0,
we find K = J = θtSSE · U ta,c + (1− θtSSE) · U ta,u > 0.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the SAG on
the real EMR access logs of a large academic medical center.
Dataset. The dataset consists of EMR access logs for 56
continuous working days in 2017. The total number of unique
accesses 〈Date, Employee, Patient〉 is around 10.75M . We
focus on the following alerts types: employee and patient: 1)
share the same last name, 2) work in the same department,
3) share the same residential address, and 4) are neighbors
within a distance less than 0.5 miles. When an access triggers
multiple types of alerts, their combination is regarded as a new
type. Table 1 lists the set of predefined alert types. For each,
we provide an instance of the payoff structure in Table 2. Its
magnitude is based on the input of a domain expert.
Performance. The audit cycle is defined to be one single
day from 0:00:00 to 23:59:59. From the dataset, we con-
struct 15 groups, each of which contains the alert logs of 41
continuous days as the historical data, and the alert logs of
the 1 subsequent day as the day for testing purpose. We set
up a real time environment for evaluation for two situations:
4Since “Quit” is rare in practice, the auditor can easily identify
illegal requests, though the auditor cannot punish the attacker yet
since no evidence of attack is collected.
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Figure 2: The auditor’s expected utility in the OSSP and alternative equilibria under a single alert type: Same Last Name.
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Figure 3: The auditor’s expected utility in the OSSP and alternative equilibria under the 7 alert types.
Table 2: The payoff structures for the pre-defined alert types.
Type ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ud,c 100 150 150 300 400 600 700
Ud,u -400 -500 -600 -800 -1000 -1500 -2000
Ua,c -2000 -2250 -2500 -2500 -3000 -5000 -6000
Ua,u 400 400 450 600 650 700 800
1) a single type (simplified case) and 2) multiple alert types
(general case). In both cases, we set the audit cost per alert
in all types to 1. We compare the real time auditor’s expected
utility for each triggered alert between the OSSP (the optimal
objective value of LP (3)) and both the offline and online SSE
(the optimal objective value of LP (2)).
Due to space limitations, we only show the results of the
first 4 testing days in Figures 2(a)-2(d) and Figures 3(a)-3(d),
all of which yield similar trends.5 As can be seen, the majority
of alerts were triggered between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM, which
generally corresponds to changes in worker shifts. After this
period, the rate of alerts slows down considerably. Imagine,
for instance, an attacker who only attacks at the very end of
an audit cycle. The knowledge from historical data is likely
to indicate that no alerts will be realized in the future. Then,
such attacks will not be covered because the available budget
will have been exhausted. To mitigate this problem, when the
mean of arrivals in the historical data drops under a certain
threshold (which is 4 in both cases), we apply the estimation
of the number of future alerts in the time point when the last
alert was triggered. We call this technique knowledge rollback.
By doing so, the budget consumption in real time is more
steady, such that the late attacker is not afforded an obvious
extra benefit. We apply this trick in computing both online
SSE and OSSP.
A. Single Type. For illustration, we consider the case where
the only alert type is Same Last Name. We set the total auditing
budget to 20. The line for offline SSE is flat because, in this
method, the auditor’s expected utility is the same for each alert
regardless of when it is triggered. There are several notable
findings and implications from Figure 2. First, in terms of
the expected utility of the auditor, OSSP outperforms offline
5The dashed lines linking nodes are for reading convenience only.
SSE and online SSE, which suggests that the SAG increases
auditing effectiveness. Second, at the end of each testing day,
the auditor’s expected utility for each approach does not drop.
We believe that this is an artifact of the knowledge rollback.
B. Multiple Types. Next, we considered all 7 alert types in
Table 1. We set the total auditing budget to 50. In the real data,
the type of each alert may not be aligned with the SSE strategy.
Thus, to compare the approaches, we only apply the SAG on
each alert whose type is the same as the best type. For other
alerts, we simply apply the online SSE. Figures 3 illustrates
the real-time expected utility of the auditor. In principle, we
have similar finds as in the single type scenario. This indicates
that, in the cases with multiple alert types, the SAG helps the
auditor lose less. In terms of the ending patterns, the expected
auditor loss comes to 0. Thus, attacks can be deterred.
In addition, we tested the average running time for optimiz-
ing the SAG on a single alert across all the testing days. By
testing on a laptop (OS: Mac OS; CPU: Intel i7 3.1GHz; Mem-
ory: 16GB), the average running time is around 0.02 seconds.
This indicates that the users are unlikely to perceive the extra
processing time incorporated by optimizing the SAG.
6 Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, we extend the advantages of signaling to the
general audit setting. We showed that strategically warning
the attacker through signaling in real time is a more effective
defensive strategy than current game theoretic approaches
that lack signaling. Our framework is generalizable to more
powerful attackers because as long as the adversarial behavior
can be represented by types, it will fit into our model. There
are several limitations we wish to highlight as opportunities for
future investigations. First, we assume a fixed payoff structure;
however, in practice, there may exist many types of attacker.
Thus, SAG can be generalized into Bayesian setting. Second,
we focus on the one attacker setting as a pilot study of SAG,
but it is necessary in the next step to investigate the situation
of multiple attackers. Third, we assume that the attacker is
perfectly rational. Such a strong assumption may lead to a
unexpected loss in practice. Thus, a robust version of the SAG
should be developed for deployment.
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